Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis introduction to our special issue on Revisiting Regional Powers examines ways in which the study of regional powers can enhance our ability to understand the dynamic nature of the international system today. The article, first, summarizes and highlights how the study of regional powers remains relevant to the broader discipline of international relations but also indicates that there remains much to improve and investigate, for instance by more systematically including less traditional issue areas for regional power engagement, including the environment or public diplomacy, by integrating disciplines beyond IR, including sociological and linguistic approaches. In today's shifting global order, researching regional powerhood is needed for a better understanding of the emergence of order(s); by highlighting, for example, less-than-global forms of cooperation and conflict, and their often-complex simultaneities. We highlight the need to investigate forms of power beyond increases in military and economic power, but also to expand the types of actors beyond the state that we consider taking on functions of regional powerhood.

Strong economic growth and assertive political leadership have made India an increasingly prominent player in global governance. Whereas conventional scholarship of India's foreign policy underlines continuity, this article explores how India's self-conception has changed across two policy fields (climate change and maritime security). Adopting a role-theoretical approach, we analyze official statements as a mirror of both India's self-understanding and its view on the roles of significant other actors. Although both issue-areas exhibit change, India's self-ascribed role has been transformed more profoundly in the maritime domain. Our comparison suggests three factors to particularly induce transformation of rising powers' roles toward 'more responsibility': First, power-sharing is more conducive than burden-sharing; second, issue-areas with strong regional anchors are more likely to induce the adoption of a more responsible role than those areas situated primarily at the global level of politics; and third, positive external role ascriptions are more effective than negative ones.

AbstractThis article discusses the usefulness of studying regional powers through a 'politics-of-scale' lens. We argue that this approach, borrowed from political geography, helps to better understand whether and how actors navigate the complex landscape of 'scales' in international politics. The combination of regional powers literature with political geography allows us to grasp the unexplored nuances of how power behaviour transcends regional and global levels and what actors (beyond the state) and processes constitute it. We test the empirical applicability of 'politics-of-scale' with the help of two country studies within the field of environmental politics: Japan, whose regional power status has been contested, but has used cooperation in the field of environment to establish itself as a regional leader within different spaces of its neighbourhood and Australia, which has reconstructed its climate regionalism in order support domestic politics and related to important domestic interest groups.

Indien hat sich unter der Regierung von Premierminister Modi den Ruf erarbeitet, eine globale Führungsrolle beim Klimaschutz eingenommen zu haben. Angesichts populistischer Tendenzen weltweit und der Abkehr von globaler Zusammenarbeit zum Klimaschutz ist der Ausgang der Wahlen in Indien im Frühjahr 2019 von großer Bedeutung.
Indien ist als momentan drittgrößter Emittent von CO2 und als am schnellsten wachsende Volkswirtschaft für eine effiziente globale Klimapolitik als ­zentraler Akteur unabdingbar. Premierminister Modi hat sich beispielsweise mit der Gründung der International Solar Alliance international einen guten Ruf erarbeitet. Auf nationaler Ebene überwiegen jedoch Berichte über die wachsende Luftverschmutzung und die Priorisierung von Industriebelangen vor Klimaschutzanliegen.
Mit der Wiederwahl von Narendra Modi zum indischen Premierminister gibt es jetzt die Möglichkeit, die nationale und globale Klimapolitik neu auszurichten. Ein Blick in die Wahlprogramme der beiden wichtigsten Parteien in Indien sowie die Analyse der dominierenden Wahlthemen zeigen allerdings, dass Umwelt- und Klimathemen von allen Parteien stark nachrangig behandelt werden.
Ein Vergleich mit anderen einflussreichen Akteuren im globalen Klimaregime, die sich in der Zeit von "Fridays for Future" wichtigen Wahlen gestellt haben oder stellen müssen (Australien, Brasilien, EU, Indonesien), zeigt deutlich, dass die Bedeutung des Klimawandels auf der politischen Agenda immer mehr wächst. Dennoch müssen Wähler gezielt mobilisiert werden, wenn sich umweltpolitische Belange auch in den Wahlergebnissen niederschlagen sollen.
Für die in der zweiten Jahreshälfte stattfindenden globalen Klimaverhandlungen ist das Wahljahr 2019 richtungsweisend. Die bisherigen Wahlergebnisse weisen jedoch darauf hin, dass wachsendes Problembewusstsein kein Garant für eine progressive Klimapolitik ist. Wenn auf deutscher oder europäischer Ebene Interesse an konstruktiver Zusammenarbeit für den Klimaschutz besteht, ist eine intensive Zusammenarbeit mit Indien, insbesondere auch mit der Zivilgesellschaft, unabdingbar.

On 1 November 2021, 197 countries will gather for the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP 26) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This summit should have taken place in 2020 already but was postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The agenda for this year's event foresees, among other issues, the conclusion of negotiations on implementation rules for the Paris Agreement and the setting of more ambitious targets by the parties in their renewed nationally determined contributions.
Non-governmental organisations and countries from the Global South expect higher emission-reduction targets and greater financial contributions from developed countries. In turn, developed states expect emerging powers to contribute more as well. A strong mismatch between expectations and outcomes could inflict a serious setback on the climate change regime.
Countries were obliged to hand in updated emission targets by the end of 2020, but only 114 had actually done so by the time of writing. Observers have found the latest submissions of multiple big emitters to be insufficient.
In the context of the pandemic, countries from around the world have stressed the need for a "green recovery" and have mobilised significant capital to alleviate the crisis. However, short-term concerns regarding stabilising the conventional economy seem to outweigh environmental aspirations, particularly for big emitters with large, impoverished populations like Brazil, China, and India.
Many countries have struck a more moderate tone on contentious issues such as ideal approaches to international cooperation, but substantial disagreement remains.
Diverging expectations and responsibility attributions are a significant obstacle for COP 26. European decision-makers need to enhance the trust developing and emerging countries feel towards them by making concrete additional commitments helping close the remaining finance and emission gaps. The latter could then follow suit and agree on an ambitious deal enhancing their own actions and concluding the remaining open negotiation items.

Seit Beginn des Jahres 2016 schrumpfen die Wirtschaften Russlands und Brasiliens, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Südafrika stagniert und selbst das chinesische Wirtschaftswachstum ist deutlich zurückgegangen. Brasilien und Südafrika erleben überdies politische Krisen. Vor diesem Hintergrund findet am 15. und 16. Oktober 2016 in Panaji in Goa/Indien der 8. BRICS-Gipfel statt; der nächste IBSA-Gipfel wurde dagegen abermals verschoben.

Die multilateralen Bemühungen für nachhaltige Entwicklung treten 2015 in eine entscheidende Phase ein. Der UN-Gipfel zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung, der im Juli 2015 in Addis Abeba stattfand, markiert den Auftakt für weitere Gipfeltreffen im Jahr 2015. Den Verhandlungsteilnehmern gelang in Addis Abeba mit dem Abschlussdokument ein Kompromiss: Insbesondere die umstrittene Frage, wie Verantwortungen für die Finanzierung von Entwicklung verteilt werden sollen, wurde zumindest für den Moment gelöst. Unzufriedenheit mit der tatsächlichen Formulierung und dem für manche Teilnehmer enttäuschenden Ergebnis bezüglich der Kooperation bei Steuerfragen wird jedoch den Verhandlungsspielraum für die kommenden Gipfeltreffen einschränken. Die Debatten vor und während des UN-Gipfels 2015 in Addis Abeba zeigen, dass die unterschiedliche (und sich verändernde) Zuschreibung von Verantwortung, also die Differenzierung von Rechten und Pflichten, auch in der globalen Entwicklungspolitik eine vorrangige Auseinandersetzung ist. Obwohl im Abschlussdokument des UN-Gipfels die Formulierung "common but differentiated responsibilities" (CBDR) nicht explizit genannt wird, verdeutlicht die Addis Ababa Action Agenda, dass eine universale Agenda mit der Forderung der "emerging economies", ihre besondere Rolle anzuerkennen, im Prinzip vereinbar ist. Viele Industriestaaten lehnen nach wie vor in Bezug auf die internationale Kooperation in Steuerfragen "gemeinsame Verantwortung" - als geteilte Macht in Institutionen - ab. Die Ergebnisse des UN-Gipfels in Addis Abeba werden sich zweifellos auf den Gipfel zur Verabschiedung der Post-2015-Entwicklungsagenda und die Klimakonferenz in Paris auswirken. Da sowohl die verstärkte internationale Kooperation beim Thema Steuern und die explizite Nennung von CBDR - erklärte Ziele der G77/China - nicht in das Abschlussdokument aufgenommen wurden, können wir erwarten, dass sich diese Gruppe der Entwicklungsländer vehement für die Berücksichtigung von CBDR während der anderen beiden Gipfel einsetzen wird.

The need to cooperate in matters of climate change requires partnerships among states, such as India and China, that in other contexts are competitors - if not rivals. This simultaneity of cooperation and competition is one of the key features of the emerging multipolar order and should take centre stage for both policy and research.
Climate change is the key challenge for the coming decade, requiring cooperation from major emitters on mitigation, adaptation, climate finance, and the decarbonisation of the energy supply. No state will be able to achieve sufficient climate action alone.
Simultaneously, geopolitical and geo-economic tensions between these actors in the increasingly multipolar global order are growing, not only in today's most obvious case of Ukraine but also on the Indo-Chinese border.
This juxtaposition of cooperation and conflict also plays out in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: at COP26 in 2021, India and China aligned to ensure that in the final agreement the commitment to a global coal phase-out became to a coal phase-down. Despite regional and global rivalry, cooperation at the intersection of issue-specific interests can yield both positive and negative outcomes.
For example, the decarbonisation of energy systems and the expansion of renewables, including solar power and (green) hydrogen offers such a field of competition over technology and trade leadership. This competition increasingly draws in the European Union and other global actors who are looking for new and reliable energy partners.
Climate change is a global challenge and requires cooperation at that level. Germany and the EU have an important role in helping to foster such cooperation even despite clashes of values and interests. Engagement with India has been given greater impetus more recently, also regarding diversification of energy sources. In the face of escalating geopolitical tensions this will be more difficult in the case of China, though nevertheless still crucial to achieve the Paris goals.

Economic and domestic political crises as well as global structural shifts that have resulted in a much tighter interconnection of events, actors, and institutions across the national, regional, and global levels have called into question the ability of so-called regional powers, such as Brazil, India, and South Africa, to have a serious impact on global politics in the remainder of the twenty-first century.
Regional powers have been considered important contributors to regional and global order because they are expected to, for example, ensure stability and effective regional cooperation in a world that is increasingly difficult to govern.
Yet, the actual outcomes of their regional projections have been mixed. While some regional powers, such as Brazil or South Africa, seem to have lost clout in the past few years, other countries, such as Saudi Arabia or Turkey, are striving for regional power status.
Regional powers face contradictory demands in regard to their global and regional policies. Being at the interface between regional and global politics poses particular challenges and often leads to indecisive, reluctant, and sometimes contradictory policy choices.
New and old regional powers are, further, facing important domestic ­challenges, such as significant downturns in their economies, corruption, and reduced state capacity to mobilise resources, as well as growing populist sentiments and even a drift towards authoritarianism. These issues create disruption in their foreign policies and represent potential challenges, due to unpredictability, for both research and policymaking.
Nevertheless, "regional powers" is still a useful analytical concept with which to make sense of some of these trends by focusing on the regional dimension of international politics. Being a regional power does not preclude being a rising power or even a great power in global terms.
Germany's and other Western countries' foreign policies often treat rising and regional powers as hubs of stability and economic prosperity. Yet, in a -changing world order, a better understanding of regional dynamics and tensions is ­needed: regional powers do not automatically serve as multipliers of policies within their regions given the sometimes low degree of regional integration. Their ability and willingness to influence their neighbourhood may change over time and policy fields; this variance should not be underestimated.